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11 Introduction
Why have some developing countries adopted state-oriented policies while
others have followed more liberal policies? Although a number of low-income
countries have initiated liberalization programmes in recent decades, partly
in￿uenced by conditional loans from international ￿nancial institutions such
a st h eW o r l dB a n ka n dt h eI M F ,t h ee x t e n to fe c o n o m i cf r e e d o mc o n t i n u e s
to vary signi￿cantly across countries.1
Table 1 illustrates recent economic freedom levels in high and low-income
countries. It ￿rst clearly shows, as expected, that various aspects of policy
which in￿uence economic freedom are more liberal in rich countries than in
poorer countries. These policy areas include more open trade policy, fewer
government regulations, and better protection of property rights. Table 1
also notes that the economic freedom gap between developed countries and
developing countries with the most liberal policies is not large.2 In contrast,
the gap is considerably wider between developing countries with the most
and the least liberal policies. Countries with more liberal policies also grow
faster. The annual income per capita growth during 1970-2000 for the most
liberal group is 3.73 percent, and 1.77 percent for the least liberal group.
F i g u r e1s h o w sap a r t i a ls c a t t e rp l o to fg r o w t hi nG D Pp e rc a p i t aa g a i n s t
a new liberal policy index that this paper derives, after controlling for the
initial income level.
This paper seeks to explain why some developing countries had more
liberal government policies than others during 1970-1999. Research on the
determinants of economic freedom is not new. This paper contributes to the
existing literature in at least two ways. First, I provide some evidence that
a concept of economic freedom that the Fraser Institute and the Heritage
1Throughout this paper, I use the terms liberal policy and economic freedom inter-
changeably. Higher economic freedom can be viewed as an outcome of the implementation
of liberal policies or economic liberalization.
2In fact, the latter group performs better in some policy areas, such as the ￿exibility
of employment regulation. Note that the ￿gures for the most liberal, developing countries
are derived from Singapore, Chile, South Korea, Cyprus and Uruguay. The ￿gures for
the least liberal countries are for Iran, Syria, Rwanda, Haiti and the Republic of Congo.
These are the top ￿ve countries with the most and the least liberal policies, according to
the newly constructed policy index. See section 5.2 for more details.
2Foundation use to derive their widely used economic freedom indices appears
to combine two diﬀerent aspects of government policy together. These two
aspects can be labelled as macroeconomic and development policies. This
paper argues that, if our interest is in the measurement of economic free-
dom, only elements of development policy should be used. I derive a new
composite index of liberal policy following this argument.
Second, whilst a range of variables have been proposed, the factors that
in￿uence economic liberalization in less developed countries remain unclear.
Partly this is because many studies focus on a narrow set of possible expla-
nations, while papers which examine a wider range of variables tend to suﬀer
from model uncertainty problems. This paper adopts Bayesian methods to
deal with this problem. This allows us to consider a much wider range of
explanatory variables than previous research.
To construct a new composite index of liberal policy, I apply both classi-
cal and outlier-robust principal components analysis to a set of ￿ve diﬀerent,
but related, Washington Consensus policy indicators. These include trade
reform, the promotion of foreign direct investment, privatization, deregula-
tion, and the protection of private property rights. Using standard growth
regressions, I then show that income per capita growth during 1970-1999 is
positively associated with higher economic freedom, as measured by the new
index. The size of the association is also notable. A one-standard-deviation
increase in the policy index raises annual growth by 0.67-0.72 percentage
points.
A model uncertainty problem is likely to prevail in our context because
there are many variables which could potentially explain economic freedom,
while there seems to be no established theories that guide how these vari-
ables may aﬀect reform. My preferred experiment considers 45 candidate
variables. Since the main focus is on a political economy approach, many of
these explanatory variables are political variables, although I also investigate
the roles of social and pre-determined factors such as media development and
social heterogeneity.
The key ￿ndings of the paper are that government policies are more
liberal in countries which are governed by right-wing or centrist political
parties, have greater political stability, and are former Spanish colonies.
3In contrast, countries which are less ethnically diverse, are former French
colonies, and have a military leader tend to adopt less liberal policies. A one-
standard-deviation change in these variables results in a 0.17-0.41 standard
deviation change in the liberal policy index, so these eﬀects are substantial.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie￿yr e v i e w st h e
literature on the determinants of economic freedom. Section 3 describes the
proxies for Washington Consensus policy indicators and some key explana-
tory variables. Section 4 discusses the concept of Bayesian model averaging
(BMA). Section 5 brie￿y explains principal components analysis and de-
scribes the construction of composite liberal policy indicators. Section 6
analyzes the growth eﬀects of the liberal policy index. Section 7 presents
the ￿ndings from BMA and then tests whether the independent variables
suggested by BMA can explain economic liberalization in a more orthodox
regression analysis. The ￿nal section concludes.
2 Related Literature
This section brie￿y reviews the literature on socio-political determinants of
economic freedom. In the context of this paper, economic freedom refers to
composite indices of economic freedom and ￿ve Washington Consensus pol-
icy aims including trade reform, the promotion of foreign direct investment,
privatization, government deregulation, and property rights protection. It
does not however cover a large literature on the relationship between these
policies and income growth.3
A number of papers that search for determinants of economic freedom
adopt indices of economic freedom proposed by the Fraser Institute (Gwart-
3For survey papers on the growth eﬀects of trade openness, see Baldwin (2003), Berg
and Krueger (2003), Winters (2004), Winters et al. (2004) and Santos-Paulino (2005).
More recent articles include Wacziarg and Welch (2003), Dollar and Kraay (2004), Lee
et al. (2004), Rruka (2004), Parikh and Stirbu (2004), Niyongabo (2004), Berggren and
Jordahl (2005) and Rigobon and Rodrik (2005). Berggren (2003), De Haan (2003) and De
Haan et al. (2006) provide surveys on the growth eﬀects of economic freedom. More recent
papers include Assane and Grammy (2003), Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003), Feld
and Voigt (2003), Cole (2003), Heitger (2003), Vega-Gordillo and `lvarez-Arce (2003),
Lundstr￿m (2003), Hasan et al. (2003), Ulubasoglu and Doucouliagos (2004), Chang et
al. (2005), Chheng (2005), Dawson (2005) and Rodrik et al. (2005). Finally, Cook and
Uchida (2003) investigates growth eﬀects of privatization in developing countries.
4ney and Lawson, 2004) and the Heritage Foundation (Miles et al., 2004) as
their dependent variable. The Fraser Institute￿s index has ￿ve sub-indices
including government size, legal structure and property rights, access to
sound money, freedom to exchange with foreigners, and regulation of credit,
labour and business.4 The Heritage Foundation￿s index consists of ten sub-
index scores including trade policy, ￿scal burden, government intervention,
monetary policy, capital ￿ows and foreign investment, banking and ￿nance,
wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and informal market activity.
This paper also uses some of these sub-indices. Section 3.1 discusses this in
more detail.
De Vanssay et al. (2005) use several political variables to explain eco-
nomic freedom in non-OECD countries, and show that government policies
are less liberal in countries which use a proportional electoral rule, and are
governed by a left-wing or centrist party. In contrast, limits on government
terms in oﬃce and the absence of executive party special interests (such
as nationalist and regional orientations) help to raise economic freedom.
The type of political regime (parliamentary and presidential), political con-
straints, and whether the chief executive is from the military appear to have
only limited explanatory power.
The eﬀects of diﬀerent types of political regime and electoral rule are
however inconclusive. Mudambi et al. (2002) ￿nd that countries which
adopt a presidential regime, use majoritarian electoral rule, and have fewer
electoral districts enjoy higher economic freedom and are also more likely to
implement liberalization programmes.5 In contrast, economic reform is more
common under a parliamentary regime in Pitlik and Wirth (2003), while
Panizza (2001) ￿nds that countries which adopt a proportional electoral rule
tend to reduce government regulation. These two studies also document the
positive eﬀect of stronger political constraints on economic freedom.
Another common ￿nding is that government fragmentation, as measured,
among others, by the number of parties in a coalition government and the
4De Haan et al. (2006) survey the determinants of the economic freedom index by the
Fraser Institute.
5Economic freedom is measured by the Fraser Institute￿s index in 1995 while economic
liberalization is the change in the index during 1990-1995.
5share of government seats in total seats, appears to have no eﬀect on the
implementation of liberal policies (Pitlik and Wirth (2003) and Lora and
Olivera (2004)).
Note that several of these political variables can be endogenous. For ex-
ample, while a left-wing executive party generally implements state-oriented
policies, parties with this ideology may gain less support in countries with
more freedom. To avoid this endogeneity issue, La Porta et al. (1999) focus
on pre-determined factors, and ￿nd that policies toward property rights,
business regulations, and state-owned enterprises are more liberal in less
ethnolinguistically fragmented countries. As expected, a socialist legal ori-
gin is linked with less liberal policies. The share of population with diﬀerent
religions is shown to have only limited explanatory power.
Whilst economic reforms in many developing countries are encouraged
by the World Bank and the IMF, recent studies have shown that the in-
￿uences of these institutions are less strong than generally believed. First,
Boockmann and Dreher (2002) reveal that while countries with more World
Bank projects exhibit more liberal policy, the amount of funding received
from the Bank is negatively associated with economic freedom. They also
discover no link between IMF activities and economic freedom. This result
is consistent with Kobrin (2005), who shows that the presence of IMF oblig-
ations and the degree of democracy do not aﬀect laws and regulations that
promote foreign direct investment. Finally, WTO member countries do not
have more open trade policy, although they seem to implement more liberal
policy in general (Rose, 2004).
Research on economic freedom also emphasizes another two arguments.
The ￿rst argument documents interdependence of political and economic
freedom, and shows that political rights and civil liberties are positively as-
sociated with liberal policies (De Haan and Sturm (2003) and Lundstr￿m
(2005)). The second argument contends that corruption is lower in countries
with more liberal policies. De Mello and Sab (2002), Graeﬀ and Mehlkop
(2003), and Goel and Nelson (2005) provide supportive evidence. The tim-
ing of economic liberalization is crucial. Corruption is lower only when
economic liberalization is implemented in rapid succession with democrati-
zation. When democratization lags behind economic liberalization, reform
6tends to increase corruption (Tavares, 2005).
Now we turn to papers which aim to explain the Washington Consensus
policy variables. First, Keefer and Knack (2002) show that more polarized
countries experience worse property rights protection, where polarization is
measured by ethnic tensions, income and land ownership inequality, and the
share of the largest ethnic group in total population. Norton (1998) obtained
similar results, and also notes that the share of Protestants (Muslims) in
total population is linked with stronger (weaker) property rights protection.
Finally, while property rights are generally less well maintained in autocratic
countries, Clague et al. (1996) provide evidence that both mature autocratic
and democratic regimes tend to have better property rights protection. This
could be because secure autocrats are also concerned about future national
income and tax revenues.
The extent of privatization is much in￿uenced by characteristics of the
government. In particular, we observe a positive eﬀect of right-wing gov-
ernment and a detrimental role for military or authoritarian government
(Bortolottia et al. (2003), Bortolotti and Siniscalco (2004), Banerjee and
Rondinelli (2003), and Banerjee and Munger (2004)). Taken togeher, these
papers also suggest that privatization is more common in countries that
adopt plurality electoral rules, are less ethnically diverse, and are more de-
mocratic. Finally, a German legal origin, which is arguably more inter-
ventionist than common law, is associated with fewer privatizations, whilst
income inequality and government fragmentation have no eﬀect.
The evidence is more limited in a Latin American sample. The following
factors have no link with the extent of privatization: degree of democracy,
the executive party￿s ideology, the share won by leftists in elections, the
eﬀective number of parties, and whether the executive party holds a majority
of seats in legislature (Biglaiser and Brown, 2003).
On the determinants of trade policy, Henisz and Mans￿eld (2004) ￿nd
that trade policy becomes less liberal when macroeconomic conditions, par-
ticularly the unemployment rate and income growth, are worse.6 This may
be due to pressure from domestic interest groups to adopt a more protective
6See Krishna and Gawande (2003) for a review of the political economy of trade policy.
7policy, e.g. by raising import tariﬀ rates. This pressure can however be oﬀset
by strong political constraints. Less open trade policy is also more common
in more populous countries (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998) and in more de-
mocratic countries in a sample of African countries (Ancharaz, 2003).
3T h e D a t a
This section ￿rst discusses proxies for Washington Consensus policy vari-
ables. These variables will be used to construct a new liberal policy index
in section 5.2. It then highlights some key independent variables that could
potentially explain economic liberalization.
3.1 The Dependent Variables
To measure how liberal government policies are, I use 13 variables to proxy
for ￿ve Washington Consensus policy aims, which can be considered as de-
velopment policy elements. Recall that these ￿ve areas are trade reform,
foriegn direct investment promotion, privatization, deregulation, and prop-
erty rights protection.7 The sample covers developing countries where the
population size in 1970 was greater than 250,000 but excludes transition
economies. The sample period is 1970-1999. Appendix Table 2 reports the
correlations among these policy variables.
I adopt four variables to proxy for the extent of trade liberalization.
The ￿rst two variables are the proportion of import duties in import val-
ues (MDUTY) from Yanikkaya (2003) and World Bank (2004), and the
Sachs and Warner (1995) trade openness dummy (SW), which is updated
by Wacziarg and Welch (2003). I use the mean values during 1970-1999
7Williamson (1990) and Fischer (2003) discuss the Washington Consensus in more de-
tail. In total, the Consensus covers ten policy aims. The remaining ￿ve areas, which can
be considered as macroeconomic policy elements, include ￿scal discipline, interest rate lib-
eralization, a competitive exchange rate, tax reform, and public expenditure prioritization.
Using Bayesian methods, Sirimaneetham and Temple (2006) provide some evidence that a
composite macroeconomic policy indicator (derived from the government budget surplus,
the in￿ation rate, and proxies for a competitive exchange rate) is associated with higher
income growth in developing countries, even after controlling for a range of institutional
variables and other growth determinants. Sirimaneetham (2006) studies the determinants
of volatility of all ten Consensus policy variables.
8for each of these two variables. The next two variables are the mean tariﬀ
rate score (TRADEFI) from Gwartney and Lawson (2004) at the Fraser
Institute, and the trade policy score (TRADEHF) from Miles et al. (2004)
at the Heritage Foundation. TRADEFI is determined by mean tariﬀ rate
while TRADEHF considers both tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers to interna-
tional trade.8
The Fraser Institute score ranges from 1 to 10, where a higher value
indicates a more liberal policy. During 1970-1999, the scores are available
at ￿ve-year intervals from 1970 to 1995, so I use the mean values of these
six observations. The Heritage Foundation score ranges from 1 to 5, where
a higher value indicates a less liberal policy. The data are available annually
from 1995, so I use the mean values during 1995-1999. The scores from both
sources are derived from observed data and subjective assessments.
Iu s et h ec a p i t a l￿ows and foreign investment score (FDIHF) to measure
how much each country promotes foreign direct investment. This score
considers factors such as restrictions on foreign ownership of business and
land, restrictions on capital transactions, and equal treatment under the law
for both foreign and domestic ￿rms.
The extent of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is proxied by three vari-
ables. The ￿rst two variables are the government enterprise and investment
score (SOEFI), which measures the share of SOEs and government invest-
ment in total investment, and the government intervention score (SOEHF),
which captures, among others, the share of government revenues from SOEs
and state ownership of businesses in total revenues. The third variable is the
share of central government employment in total employment (GOV TEM)
from World Bank (2001).9
Next, I employ three variables to measure government regulations. The
￿rst measure is the simple average of three sub-index scores from the Her-
itage foundation, namely, the banking and ￿nance score, the wages and
prices score, and the regulation score (REGHF). The second measure is the
8Note that all score names ending with FI are from the Fraser Institute and those
ending with HF are from the Heritage Foundation.
9A more direct measure for the extent of privatization would be the share of state-
owned enterprises in total investment and output. World Bank (1995) provides these data
but only for a limited number of developing countries.
9regulation of credit, labour and business score (REGFI). The last variable
is the regulatory quality score from Kaufmann et al. (2003) (REGKKM).
Among others, these variables cover minimum wage laws, government price
and interest rate controls, ownership of banks, the ease of obtaining a busi-
ness license, and the eﬃciency of the tax collection system.
Finally, the degree to which property rights are protected is measured
by the legal system and property rights score (PROPFI) and the property
rights score (PROPHF). These variables re￿ect, for example, government
expropriation risk of property, judicial independence, protection of intellec-
tual property, and military interference in the rule of law.
3.2 The Independent Variables
This section describes some of the key independent variables. Appendix
Table 6 provides descriptions and data sources for all independent variables.
Perhaps the most widely studied political variables are political regime
types (presidential, DIRCPRES, and parliamentary, PARLIA)a n de l e c -
toral rules (plural, PLURAL, and proportional, PROPOR). These vari-
ables are taken from Beck et al. (2001). The literature survey in section
2 has shown that the eﬀects of these variables have proved ambiguous in
empirical work to date.
The eﬀect of political constraints on economic liberalization is also less
clear. Although some studies in the literature survey above ￿nd that stronger
political constraints result in more liberal policies10, economic reform might
be less likely where the constraints are very strong because the short-term
costs of reforms, such as rising unemployment, can be high. The extent of
political constraints (POLCON), from Henisz (2000), is considered stronger
when there are many independent veto players (such as presidents and judi-
ciary), those veto players are not aligned, and they exhibit diﬀerent political
ideologies.
A variable closely related to POLCONis the legislative index of electoral
competitiveness (LIEC) (Beck et al., 2001). Higher values correspond to
more intense competition in elections. For example, the maximum score
10See Panizza (2001), Pitlik and Wirth (2003), and Henisz and Mans￿eld (2004).
10indicates that the largest party obtained less than 75 percent of total seats in
the election while the minimum score indicates that there is no legislature.
The concept of political constraints highlights the importance of diﬀer-
ences in political ideology across political agents (WINGDIFF).T h i s i s
measured by the maximum diﬀerence between the executive party￿s political
ideology and the four principal parties of the legislature (the three largest
government parties and the largest opposition party). In this paper, politi-
cal ideology has three classi￿cations: right-wing (RGHTWING),l e f t - w i n g
(LEFTWING) and centrist (CNTRWING). Right-wing parties can be
labelled as conservative, and in general adopt liberal, market-based policies.
Left-wing parties can be labelled as communist, socialist or social democratic
parties, and would typically believe in state-based policies. Finally, centrist
parties are those that adopt both right- and left-wing policies, e.g. promot-
ing private enterprises but also social liberalism. These political ideology
variables are taken from Beck et al. (2001).
When the constitution allows the government to serve additional terms
in the oﬃce (and each term has a ￿nite length), this should act as an in-
c e n t i v ef o rt h eg o v e r n m e n tt oi m p l e m e n tm o r ee ﬀective policies in order to
attract more votes in the next election. I refer to this as the re-electability
incentive (FIMUTERM). In contrast, when the threat of changes in gov-
ernment is persistent, the quality of policy may be poorer because the gov-
ernment is unlikely to face the consequences of bad policies. I measure gov-
ernment instability by two pairs of variables. The ￿rst pair, from Beck et
al. (2001), measures the actual changes in executives and executive parties
during 1975-1999 (EXECHG and PARTYCHG). The second pair, from
Feng (1997) and Feng et al. (2000), measure probabilities of changes in the
government (PROBIRCH and PROBMJCH).11 PROBIRCH predicts
unconstitutional, irregular changes such as those result from coups, while
PROBMJCH predicts constitutional, major changes such as changes in
leadership.
On a wider scale, I measure political stability (POLSTAB) by the vari-
able introduced in Kaufmann et al. (2003). This composite index covers
11These probabilities are derived from a logit model, and depend on various factors such
as past macroeconomic performance and political disorder.
11events such as political protests, coups, riots, civil wars, and ethnic and
religious-based tensions. The alternative proxies for POLSTAB are two
new variables which I construct from a principal components analysis. The
￿r s to ft h e s ei sv i o l e n tu n r e s t(VIUNR EST), which measures assassina-
tions, guerilla warfare, government crises, purges, revolutions, coups, and ri-
ots. A measure of non-violent unrest (NVUNREST) re￿ects general strikes
and antigovernment demonstrations.12 I use data from De Mesquita et al.
(2003).
In measuring the degree of democracy, I use the Polity score (POLITY)
by Marshall and Jaggers (2002). The score is obtained by subtracting an
autocracy score from a democracy score, and this depends on factors such
as political constraints and competitiveness of political participation. In
democratic societies, a transparent, corruption-free election should typically
result in a more eﬃcient government being elected. Beck et al. (2001)
provide a dummy variable indicating the presence of election fraud, such
that the outcome is not reliable (FRAUDELE).
In a society where citizens are concerned with public aﬀairs, the govern-
ment should be less likely to implement a severely harmful policy. I proxy
how active political participation is by voter turnout (TURNOUT) (Pintor
et al., 2002). But such interest in politics may be more bene￿cial when
the mass media is suﬃciently developed. When the media is more devel-
oped, voters are better informed about their government￿s performance, and
politicians are more likely to be held accountable for their actions. I con-
struct a measure of media development (MEDIADEV) from a principal
components analysis which includes the number of television sets, radios,
and daily newspaper circulation during 1970-1999.13
An important set of historical variables are three proxies for the deter-
minants of the quality of current institutions (Acemoglu et al. (2001) and
12See section 5.1 for a brief discussion of principal components analysis. VIUNR EST=
0.360∗assassinations+0.316∗purges+0.466∗revolutions+0.235∗coups+0.308∗riots+0.422∗
government crises+0.475∗guerilla warfare. The ￿rst principal component explains
nearly 40 percent of the total variation in the data. NVUNREST =0 .707∗general
strikes+0.707∗antigovernment demonstrations.
13MEDIADEV =0 .572∗television set+0.577∗radio+0.583∗newspaper. The ￿rst prin-
cipal component explains 84 percent of the total variation in the data.
12Hall and Jones (1999)). These are the proportion of population that speak
European languages (EURFRAC), the mortality rates of European settlers
between the 17th and 19th centuries (MORTAL), and the proportion of
the population that was of European descent in 1900 (EUR1900).
Finally, I also test the eﬀects of geographic variables on economic free-
dom. The relevant variables are land area (AREAKM2),l a t i t u d e(LATILLSV ),
the proportion of land area with a tropical climate (TROPICAR),m i n i m u m
distance to a major market (LMINDIST), a dummy for landlocked coun-
tries (LANDLOCK), and a dummy specifying that a country is an exporter
of point-source natural resources such as oil and diamonds (RESPOINT)
(Isham et al., 2005).
4 Bayesian Model Averaging
Even when the main focus is on a political economy approach, one can imag-
ine that there are many variables that could potentially explain why some
governments adopt more liberal policies than others. There also appears to
be no established theories that guide how these variables aﬀect liberal poli-
cies. This suggests that the model uncertainty problem is likely to prevail
in our context.
This section brie￿y discusses a Bayesian model averaging (BMA) ap-
proach. It follows closely the discussions in Raftery (1995), Raftery et al.
(1997), and Malik and Temple (2005). BMA reduces model uncertainty by
taking into account many possible models. A standard Bayesian principle




Pr(∆ | Mk,D)Pr(Mk | D) (1)
where ∆ is a parameter of interest, Pr(∆ | D) is the posterior distrib-
ution of ∆ given the data D,a n dM1, M2,..., MK denote models. Equa-
tion (1) suggests that the density of the parameter ∆ given the data D is
the weighted average of the posterior distributions of ∆ under each model,
Pr(∆ | Mk,D), where the weights re￿ect the corresponding posterior model
probability (PMP), Pr(Mk | D).
13The PMP is the probability that model Mk generates the data D,a n d









Pr(D | θk,M k)Pr(θk | Mk)dθk (3)
Pr(D | Mk) is the marginal likelihood of the data given Mk, θk is the
vector of parameters of model Mk, Pr(D | θk,M k) is the likelihood of θk
under model Mk, Pr(θk | Mk) is the prior density of θk under model Mk,
and Pr(Mk) is the prior probability that Mk i st h et r u em o d e l . W i t h o u t
r e l i a b l ep r i o ri n f o r m a t i o n ,i ti sa s s u m e dt h a te a c hm o d e lh a sa ne q u a lp r i o r
probability of being the true model, so that Pr(M1)=P r ( M2)=... =




Pr(M  | D)=1 .
In a simpli￿ed, two-model case, the predictive ability of the models is















The ￿rst term on the right-hand side of equation (4) is called the Bayes
factor for M2 against M1,d e n o t e db yB 21. Here, the posterior odds depend
only on the Bayes factor because Pr(M1)=P r ( M2)=0 .5.W h e n B 21>1,
M2 has better predictive ability than M1.
When there are many possible models, calculating the integral in equa-
tion (3) is computationally intensive. One solution is to use the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) to approximate the Bayes factors. For a lin-
ear regression with normal errors, the BIC of model Mk takes the following
form:
BIC0
k = nlog(1 − R2
k)+qk logn (5)
14where n i st h es a m p l es i z e ,R2
k is the R2 value for model Mk,a n dqk is
the number of independent variables (excluding the intercept). Essentially,
BIC0
k assesses how well Mk can predict the data, given its number of ex-
planatory variables. A model with a higher R2 and fewer parameters (which
results in a lower BIC0 value) is regarded as a better model by the BIC
approximation.
An approximation, as in Raftery (1995) and Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004),
suggests that Pr(D | Mk) ∝ exp(−0.5BIC0
k), and hence equation (2) can be
re-written as:







With many possible models, estimating every single model is not feasible
because the number of terms in equation (1) will be huge. In this case there
m a yb ea sm a n ya s4 5i n d e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l e s ,s ot h e r ea r e245 models to
estimate. This is over 35 thousand billion models. One solution is Occam￿s
Window due to Madigan and Raftery (1994). This paper uses a symmetric
version of Occam￿s Window, where it excludes models that can predict the
data much less well than the best model (the model with the highest PMP).14
A search algorithm is needed to ￿nd good subsets of all models, and place
these models in Occam￿s Window. The search algorithm that is adopted here
is a branch-and-bounds search algorithm. To perform a BMA exercise, I use
the bicreg software which implements the Occam￿s Window algorithm for
linear regression using the BIC approximation to Bayes factors.15
In addition to the Occam￿s Window approach, I also experimented with a
Markov chain Monte Carlo model composition (MC3) approach as a robust-
ness check (Hoeting et al., 1996). MC3 uses a Markov chain Monte Carlo
method to approximate all models in equation (1). The results are generally
more outlier-robust than those from the Occam￿s Window approach. The
MC3.REG software is used to perform this task.16
14More speci￿cally, I drop all models whose PMP is only 1/100 or less that of the best
model. The strict version of Occam￿s Window also excludes models that predict the data
worse than their smaller submodels.
15The software is written by Adrian Raftery and revised by Chris Volinsky.
16The software is written by Jennifer Hoeting with the assistance of Gary Gadbury.
15One important statistic is the posterior inclusion probability (PIP), de-
￿ned as the probability that the coeﬃcient of an independent variable is
not equal to zero, Pr(βi 6=0| D). It is calculated by summing the PMPs
across models where Pr(βi 6=0| D). Hence, variables with high PIP values
are those that appear in many models or appear in models with high PMP
values.
Finally, it should be noted that the bicreg software cannot be applied
where data on some variables are missing. I thus employed a simple impu-
tation method, which predicts missing data from a given set of independent
variables by a best-subset regression. A best-subset regression ￿nds sub-
sets of independent variables that best predict responses on a dependent
variable. Even though up to 55 independent variables need imputation, the
proportion of imputed data in the main data set is only 1.28 percent of the
total number of cells. Appendix Table 7 provides more detail on variable
imputation.
5 Measuring Liberal Policy
This section ￿rst brie￿y discusses methods of classical and outlier-robust
principal components. Using these approaches, section 5.2 explains how the
composite liberal policy indices are constructed.
5.1 Principal Components Analysis
I use a principal components analysis (PCA) to construct the composite
index of liberal policy. PCA takes n speci￿c variables (in this case, policy
variables) and yields principal components P1, P2,..., Pn that are mutually
uncorrelated. Each principal component is a linear, weighted combination
of n speci￿cv a r i a b l e sX1, X2,..., Xn or more formally P = α1X1 + α2X2 +
... + αnXn where α0s are component loadings.
The ￿rst principal component, P1, has the maximum variance for any
possible weights, subject to the sum-of-squares normalization that α0α =1 .
Both the bicreg and MC3.REG routines were originally written in the S-Plus language
and were modi￿ed for the R language by Ian Painter.
16Thus, P1 always accounts for the largest proportion of the variance in the
data.
The method of principal components is a data reduction method because
much of the total variance in the data can generally be accounted for by the
￿rst few principal components. I use only the ￿rst principal component to
represent the liberal policy index. Because the measurement units diﬀer
across the proxies for the policy variables, the correlation matrix is used for
the analysis. This makes component loadings comparable, and means the
weights are determined independently of the measurement scales.
Note that the analysis based on a classical PCA can be sensitive to
outlying observations. This is because its aim is to maximize the variance
given the covariance (or correlation) matrix, and both the variance and the
covariance matrix can be highly in￿uenced by outliers. A preferred method
is therefore a outlier-robust PCA as introduced in Hubert et al. (2005).
Ar o b u s tP C A￿nds h observations out of the whole data set of n ob-
servations whose covariance matrix has the smallest determinant. This co-
variance matrix is used to derive robust principal components. I use the
default choice h =0 .75n, which drops 25 percent of the most outlying data
points. The degree of outlyingness assigned to each observation is based on
the minimum covariance determinant (MCD) estimator. When the number
of n (and therefore h) is large, a robust PCA uses an approximate algorithm
as in Rousseeuw and Driessen (1999) to ￿nd the h observations.







n where X0￿s are the original data adjusted by their
robust centre using a robust estimate of their location. This is performed
by the robpca software written in the S-Plus language.17
5.2 Constructing Composite Liberal Policy Index
This section shows how the new composite liberal policy index is derived.
Recall that I construct this index by applying a principal components analy-
sis (PCA) to a set of the Washington Consensus policy variables. The em-
phasis will be on the results obtained from a robust PCA rather than a
17The software is written by Jan Wijfels and adapted by Karlien Vanden Branden.
17classical PCA.
The above literature survey has shown that the economic freedom indices
from the Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation capture both macro-
economic aspects (such as ￿scal and monetary policies) and development
aspects (such as regulation and property rights) of government policy. This
section will show that macroeconomic and development policies are two dif-
ferent dimensions of government policy. If our aim is to measure economic
freedom or how liberal government policies are, rather than how well the
government manages macroeconomic conditions, the emphasis should be on
development policy rather than macroeconomic policy.
To demonstrate this, I applied the principal components analysis to 23
proxies for the ten Washington Consensus policy aims. I also add the in-
￿ation rate into this list. As Table 2 illustrates, the top ￿ve policy aims
and the in￿ation rate can be considered as macroeconomic elements, and
the bottom ￿ve as development elements. Here, it suﬃces to note that the
proxies of macroeconomic elements include central government budget sur-
plus (SURPLUS), central government debt (DEBT), the real interest rate
(REALI),b l a c km a r k e tp r e m i u m(BMP), an currency overvaluation in-
dex (OVERVALU), the variability of OVERVALU (ERATE),t h es h a r e
of educational and health spending in total public expenditure (EDU and
HEALTH), and marginal tax rate score (MARTAXFI).18 Sirimaneetham
and Temple (2006) describe these variables in greater detail.
The robust results in column (1) shows that seven out of ten proxies for
the macroeconomic elements are more correlated with the second principal
component (PC) than the ￿rst PC. In contrast, ten out of 13 proxies for
the development elements are more correlated with the ￿rst PC than the
second PC. These results suggest that while the second PC tends to represent
government eﬀectiveness in managing macroeconomic conditions such as
public debt, the price level, and the real exchange rate, the second PC
appears to capture the extent of government roles on economic activities
18Although it is arguable that EDU, HEALTH and MARTAXFI represent social
policy rather than macroeconomic policy, the key idea here is to show that development
policy is one distinctive dimension of government policy, which should be analyzed sepa-
rately.
18(such as public enterprises) and transactions (such as import tariﬀsa n d
regulations).
I nc o l u m n( 2 ) ,t h es a m p l es i z ei n c r e a s e sc o n s i d e r a b l yw h e nId r o pf o u r
variables which are available for a lower number of countries. The ￿nd-
ings are similar to those in column (1), although the robust results for the
macroeconomic elements are less clear-cut. Overall, these results indicate
that macroeconomic and development policies are two distinctive types of
policy, and it is perhaps more sensible to use only development policy as a
proxy for liberal policies or economic freedom.19
Table 3 illustrates the construction of the new liberal policy index. I
begin by including all proxies for the development elements into a single
model, as shown in column (1). The results are promising. Apart from
GOV TEM, all other policy variables are correlated with the ￿rst PC with
the expected signs. This ￿rst PC explains over 45 percent of the total
v a r i a t i o ni nt h ed a t a .
To increase the sample size, column (2) drops TRADEFIand GOV TEM,
which are available for fewer countries. It shows that, apart from PROPFI,
all other policy variables are more associated with the ￿rst PC than the sec-
o n dP C ,a n dw i t ht h ec o r r e c ts i g n s .T h e￿rst PC explains nearly 55 percent
of the total variation in the data. These results suggest that, in our context,
as i n g l em e a s u r e( t h e￿rst PC) can be used to measure economic freedom.
The robust liberal policy index, RLIBERAL, therefore consists of 11
variables, and can be written as:
RLIBERAL = −0.184 ∗ MDUTY0 +0 .331 ∗ SW0 − 0.335 ∗ (7)
TRADEHF0 − 0.309 ∗ FDIHF0 +0 .261 ∗ SOEFI0
−0.269 ∗ SOEHF0 +0 .405 ∗ REGKKM0 +0 .250 ∗
REGFI0 − 0.337 ∗ REGHF0 +0 .227 ∗ PROPFI0
−0.342 ∗ PROPHF0
19Caudill et al. (2000) and `lvarez-Arce and Vega-Gordillo (2005) provide closely re-
lated arguments. Heckelman and Stroup (2005) also note that when diﬀerent aggregation
methods are used to aggregate sub-index scores into an overall score (such as simple aver-
aging and principal components analysis), the rankings of overall economic freedom indices
can be signi￿cantly diﬀerent.
19where the 0 on the policy variables indicates that each has been centred
using a robust estimate of its location. The component loadings or weights
are comparable across variables, as they are derived from the correlation
matrix. A higher RLIBERAL value indicates a more liberal policy.
It is worth noting that the decision to drop TRADEFI and GOV TEM
in column (1) and the use of robust rather than classical scores in column
(2) are unlikely to aﬀect the results in a meaningful way. The simple corre-
lations between RLIBERAL and the robust scores obtained from column
(1) with 13 policy variables, and between RLIBERAL and the index from
the classical scores in column (2), CLIBERAL, are both over 0.99.20
According to this new index, which is available for 68 developing coun-
tries, the top ￿ve countries with the most liberal policies during 1970-1999
were Singapore, Chile, South Korea, Cyprus and Uruguay. In contrast, gov-
ernment policies were state-oriented in Iran, Syria, Rwanda, Haiti and the
Republic of Congo.
The correlations between RLIBERAL and the economic freedom indices
from the Heritage Foundation and the Fraser Institute are high (0.95 and
0.56 in absolute terms, respectively). This is not surprising, given that many
elements of RLIBERAL are from these two sources. But it is important to
note that, unlike the two economic freedom indices, the new index does not
include macroeconomic policy variables.
6 Liberal Policy and Growth Regressions
This section empirically tests the growth eﬀects of the liberal policy index
(RLIBERAL). The growth regression speci￿cation that I use is based
on Mankiw et al. (1992). The dependent variable is de￿ned as the log
diﬀerence in GDP per capita between 1970 and 1999. The explanatory
variables include the log of GDP per capita in 1970, the log of the average
investment share in GDP, the log of population growth adjusted by the
capital depreciation rate (0.05), a measure of educational attainment in
20CLIBERAL = −0.194 ∗ MDUTY +0 .323 ∗ SW − 0.339 ∗ TRADEHF − 0.332 ∗
FDIHF +0 .251 ∗ SOEFI − 0.239 ∗ SOEHF +0 .394 ∗ REGKKM +0 .257 ∗ REGFI −
0.356 ∗ REGHF +0 .204 ∗ PROPFI− 0.350 ∗ PROPHF
201970, and regional dummies.
Column (1) in Table 4 shows that, without any other explanatory vari-
ables, RLIBERAL has a positive relationship with growth and this is signif-
icant at the 1 percent level. The liberal policy index alone explains about 15
percent of the total variation in growth rates. Column (2) adds the standard
growth determinants while column (3) further adds the regional dummies.
RLIBERAL remains signi￿cant at the 5 percent level. The strength of the
association is sizeable. In column (3), a one-standard-deviation increase in
RLIBERAL (from Brazil to Thailand￿s level) raises growth by 0.72 per-
centage points. Over the 30-year period, this translates into a 23 percent
increase in income per capita.
In column (4), I exclude the investment variable, and show that the
size of the growth eﬀect of RLIBERAL increases. This suggests that more
liberal policy partly contributes to higher growth by raising the share of
investment in GDP.21
These results are not sensitive to the deletion of outlying observations, as
detected by median or least absolute deviation (LAD) regression22,D F I T ,
DFBETA, and added-variable plots.23 Diagnostic tests do not indicate any
problems with omitted structure and functional form (from Ramsey￿s regres-
sion speci￿cation error test) and heteroskedasticity (from the Breusch-Pagan
and White tests).
7 Explaining Liberal Policy
This section searches for the determinants of liberal policy. It ￿rst uses
a Bayesian model averaging (BMA) approach to evaluate sets of possible
independent variables. Section 7.2 then uses the sets of variables that are
21This ￿nding is however not con￿rmed in regressions that directly test the eﬀects of
RLIBERAL on investment. Countries with more liberal policies do not seem to have
higher shares of total and private investment in output during 1970-1999. The results are
available upon request.
22Outlying observations are de￿ned as countries whose residuals are greater (less) than
the mean value of all residuals plus (minus) two times standard deviation of that country￿s
residual.
23The results are available upon request. Cook and Uchida (2003, p. 153-54) brie￿y
e x p l a i nh o wD F I T Sa n dD F B E T Aa r ec o m p u t e da n du s e d .
21suggested by BMA in regressions that aim to explain RLIBERAL.
7.1 BMA Results
This section describes how the BMA exercise is performed. It suggests two
lists of explanatory variables that form the best models in two diﬀerent ap-
proaches. I start in column (1) of Table 5 by including 40 main independent
variables. Most of these are political and social variables, which tend to
have a clearer interpretation as to how they aﬀect economic freedom than
pre-determined factors such as geographical variables. In this paper, only
variables with a posterior inclusion probability (PIP) value of 0.20 and over
are considered important.
The ￿rst column suggests 11 variables with a PIP over 0.20, while (+)
and (-) indicate the directions of the relationship between each variable
and RLIBERAL.24 These results are not sensitive to various alterna-
tive proxies.25 One unrobust case is when the political stability variable
(POLSTAB) is replaced by political violence variables from Vu Le (2001,
VUL ESPI, VUL ESPI1 and VUL ESPI2) and by two new political un-
rest variables (NVUNREST and VIUNR EST). Unlike POLSTAB,t h e s e
variables have low PIP values. One possible explanation might be that while
POLSTAB captures wide-scale social and political disorders, the alterna-
tive proxies only focus on political violence.26
24In another experiment, I also included the shares of population with diﬀerent religions.
These variables however have low PIP values.
25This includes (1) replace POLITY with the degree of democracy variables from Reich
(2002, REICEDEM) and Golder (2004, GOLDERDE). (2) Replace POLCON with
the share of government seats in total seats (MAJORITY), the Her￿ndahl index of gov-
ernment seat shares (HERFGOV), the chance that two randomly selected deputies will
be from diﬀerent parties (GOV FRAC), a dummy showing if the executive party controls
all houses with lawmaking powers (ALLHOUSE), and the share of veto players who drop
from the government (STABS). These variables are from Beck et al. (2001). I also tried
the executive constraints variable from Marshall and Jaggers (2002, XCONST). (3) Re-
place MEDIADEV with an index of press freedom by Karlekar (2004, FREEPRES). (4)
Replace FRUADELE with the score of free and fair elections by Coppedge and Reinicke
(1990, POLYARC) and a variable that measures the universal application voting right by
Paxton et al. (2003, SUFFRAGE). (5) Replace ethnic fragmentation (ETHNFRAC)
with linguistic (LINGFRAC) and religious (RELIFRAC) fragmentation.
26Another fragile case is when POLCON is replaced by the strength of political checks
and balances system score from Beck et al. (2001, CHECKS). Unlike POLCON,
22One can imagine that some of the independent variables in column (1)
may aﬀect liberal policy through changes in the degree of political instabil-
ity. For example, more ethnically homogeneous societies may experience less
social disorder, which, according to the results above, leads to more liberal
policy. An inclusion of variables which measure severe disorder might there-
fore reduce the explanatory power of other variables. To test this argument,
column (2) drops three variables including political stability (POLSTAB),
adverse regime changes (ADREGCHG), and the probability of unlawful
changes in the government (PROBIRCH). The results in column (1) do
not seem to change signi￿cantly.27
Column (3) adds ￿ve regional dummies while column (4) adds two his-
torical variables and eight geographic variables into column (1).28 In to-
tal, column (4), which is the preferred set of results, suggests 14 variables
with PIPs over 0.20. Among others, it reveals that economic freedom is
higher in countries which experience less social and political disorder, exhibit
higher government stability, and where their government believes in market-
oriented policy. In contrast, countries which are less ethnically diverse, have
a military oﬃcer as head of state, and where corruption is widespread, adopt
less liberal policies.
The results also highlight the important roles of historical and geograph-
ical variables. In particular, economic liberalization is more common in for-
mer Spanish colonies than in their French counterparts. Countries with a
smaller proportion of tropical land area, and countries which are further
away from a major world market also experience lower economic freedom.
To check the robustness of these results from the bicreg approach, I
applied a MC3 approach to column (4). The results are shown in column
CHECKS has a high PIP value with a negative sign. CHECKS however lacks ex-
planatory power when added into a later regression that explains RLIBERAL (column
(2) of Table 8).
27This ￿nding remains unchanged when dropping only POLSTAB, which has a high
PIP value in column (1).
28In another experiment, I also included two additional historical variables (setter mor-
tality rate, MORTAL, and European settlers, EURO1900) into column (4). These vari-
ables however reduce the sample size signi￿cantly. Note also that although the bicreg
software for R can handle up to 49 variables in a single model, the maximum number of
variables I use is 45 variables to allow for a manageable computation time. As a result,
column (4) drops ten variables with low PIP values in column (3).
23(4.1). An important software limitation here is that the number of variables
t h a tc a nb ei n c l u d e di naMC3 exercise must not be greater than half of the
number of observations. Hence, only the top 30 variables with the highest
PIP values in column (4) are used. Similar to the bicreg case, variables with
posterior probabilities of 0.20 or greater are considered important and are
in bold.
This robustness test indicates that the results from the bicreg approach
are not excessively in￿uenced by outlying observations. In column (4.1),
nine out of 14 variables with high PIP values in column (4) are suggested by
the MC3 approach. Moreover, we can see that most of the variables with
very high PIP values in column (1) remain important across all experiments.
It is interesting to note that some key political variables, such as po-
litical constraints and the types of political regime and electoral rule, have
only limited in￿uence on economic freedom. In addition, the roles of a na-
tionalist executive party, media development, and trade openness, which
have high PIP values in column (1), disappear once regional dummies and
pre-determined factors are controlled for.
Table 6 displays the structure of the top ten models, ranked by their
posterior model probability (PMP) values, from column (4) in Table 5. It
shows that the best model from the bicreg approach consists of 11 variables.
T h e s ev a r i a b l e sw i l lf o r mt h eb a s e l i n em o d e li nt h en e x ts e c t i o n .T h eP M P
value of the best model is nearly 0.05, compared with the prior probability,
considering that there are 245 possible models to estimate, of 2.8 ￿ 10−14.
Table 7 shows the top ten models obtained from the MC3 approach from
column (4.1) in Table 5. The best model has nine variables, where six of
these also appear in the best model from the bicreg method.
7.2 Regression Results
This section uses a regression analysis to estimate the roles of the variables
in the best models in Tables 6 and 7 in explaining RLIBERAL.C o l u m n
(1) in Table 8 contains 11 variables that form the best model from the
bicreg approach. It shows that all variables, except tropical land area, have
as i g n i ￿cant relationship with RLIBERAL at the 5 percent level. Taken
24together, these variables explain about 85 percent of the total variation in
the data.
Column (2) adds regional dummies and the initial income level and pop-
ulation size as control variables. The results emphasize the importance of
political executives in pursuing liberalization programmes. More speci￿cally,
while right- and centrist-wing executive parties tend to adopt market-based
policies, countries that are led by a military oﬃcer have typically followed
state-oriented policies more often. Social conditions are also in￿uential. So-
cieties that possess higher political stability, have lower corruption, and are
more ethnically diverse tend to have more liberal policy. Finally, former
Spanish colonies seem to enjoy higher economic freedom.
The ￿nding that ethnic fragmentation (ETHNFRAC) leads to higher
economic freedom is rather surprising.29 Existing research, at least since
Easterly and Levine (1997), has generally suggested that ethnic divisions
lead to lower income growth and less eﬀective policies.30 In our context,
Alesina et al. (2003) show that ETHNFRAC has no eﬀect on two elements
of the liberal policy index, PROPHF and REGHF. In addition, while
ETHNFRAC is negatively associated with SOEFI at the 10 percent level,
this relationship disappears in models which also control for population size
and regional dummies.31 One possible explanation for the positive eﬀect
of ethnic diversity is that governments in ethnically diverse societies may
prefer market-based policies to state-oriented policies since the latter are
potentially more divisive by favouring certain ethnic groups.
Column (3) is used to investigate whether the negative association be-
tween corruption (CORRUPT) and RLIBERAL might be in￿uenced by
outlying observations. CORRUPT becomes signi￿cant only at the 10 level
29Ia l s ot e s t e df o ran o n - l i n e a re ﬀect of ETHNFRAC by adding its squared terms into
column (2). The result is unclear, since although the squared term is signi￿cant at the 5
percent level, the linear term is no longer signi￿cant.
30See, for example, La Porta et al. (1999). The detrimental eﬀect of ethnic heterogeneity
can however be mitigated in democratic countries (Collier, 2000) and in countries which
possess good quality institutions (Easterly, 2001). Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) provide
a recent survey on ethnic diversity.
31They also document that religious diversity (RELIFRAC) leads to more liberal poli-
cies in terms of PROPHF and REGGHF. Linguistic fragmentation (LINGFRAC)h a s
no eﬀect on PROPHF, REGHF and SOEFI.
25when excluding outliers suggested by the median regression method. It is
no longer signi￿cant when dropping outliers from the DFIT method (results
not shown).32
Column (4) contains nine variables that form the best model from the
MC3 approach. Column (5) adds control variables into column (4). It can
be seen that six of these nine variables also appear in columns (1) to (3), and
the overall results are very similar to those discussed above. One additional
￿nding is that liberal policy is less likely in former French colonies. These
results are robust to the deletion of outlying observations.33
While it is well known that an English colonization legacy is more liberal
than the French approach34, it is less clear why economic freedom is higher
in former Spanish colonies than in former French colonies. Partly this is
because Spain￿s legal origin is based on French civil law, so the eﬀects of
diﬀerent legal traditions play no role here. Spanish and French colonization
strategies were also similar in various aspects, such as centralization of power
and restricted trade policy (Grier, 1999).35
The strength of association between these explanatory variables and the
liberal policy index are displayed at the bottom panel of Table 8. Each
￿beta￿ value indicates the size of the change in RLIBERAL (in terms of
its standard deviation) given a one-standard-deviation change in the inde-
pendent variable. For example, based on the estimates in column (2), a one-
standard-deviation increase in POLSTAB (from Philippines to Malaysia￿s
32The outliers from the median regression method are Kenya, Syria, Uganda and Zam-
bia, and those from the DFIT method are Colombia, Sri Lanka, Syria and Uganda.
33In addition to the DFIT and median regression methods, this also includes dropping
Sri Lanka and Syria, the potential outliers suggested by the MC
3 approach.
34Compared to the French, the English gave more authority to local governments in
colonized territories, allowed freer international trade, and provided better education to
local people (Grier, 1999). La Porta et al. (1999) also note that while English common
law aims to protect citizens from the power of state, French civil law is designed to extend
such power. We can therefore expect better property rights protection in former British
colonies. Bortolotti and Siniscalco (2004) also ￿nd that the size of state-owned enterprises
in an economy is larger in civil law countries than in common law countries.
35Between the two, Grier (1999) notes that the Spanish had more restricted trade policy
than the French by establishing a mercantilist trade system, which allowed colonies to
trade only with Spain. Acemoglu et al. (2001) also document the exploitative colonization
strategy adopted by the Spanish (and the Portuguese). For example, the main objective
of colonization was to obtain valuable resources such as gold from America.
26level) raises RLIBERAL by 0.24 of a standard deviation (from Brazil to
Malaysia￿s level).
It has so far been shown that economic freedom is associated with several
social and political variables. The directions of the relevant causal eﬀects
are however not always clear. It is not hard to imagine that changes in
economic freedom levels can also aﬀect some of the explanatory variables
above. For instance, while political instability tends to disrupt economic
reform, a government￿s decision to privatize state-owned enterprises or to
raise import tariﬀs in some sectors may lead to antigovernment demonstra-
tions by adversely aﬀected groups, and therefore higher political instability
in general. Although an ability to develop causal relationships is important,
it is rather diﬃcult to ￿nd a convincing set of instrument variables.
In relation to the existing literature, three conclusions can be drawn from
this section. First, consistent with several studies, I ￿nd that the charac-
teristics of the political executive (right-wing governments and military or
authoritarian governments) play a signi￿cant role in the implementation of
liberal policies. Second, while the literature has noted the positive eﬀects of
stronger political contraints and democratization on economic freedom, this
paper showed that these associations disappear once we control for a wider
range of independent variables. I also found no link between economic free-
dom and the types of political regime and electoral rule, whilst the evidence
in this area has so far been inconclusive. Third, although it is generally
found that higher corruption is associated with less liberal policy, this paper
highlights the signi￿cant roles of anomalous observations in this context.
8 Conclusions
This paper has sought to explain why some developing countries had more
liberal government policies than others during 1970-1999. To measure lib-
eral policies, I applied a method of classical and outlier-robust principal
components to the proxies of ￿ve Washington Consensus policy aims. These
include trade liberalization, foreign direct investment promotion, privatiza-
tion, deregulation, and property rights protection. I also argued that, if our
aim is to measure economic freedom, we should restrict our focus to these
27policy areas, rather than also considering macroeconomic variables such as
the ￿scal surplus and the in￿ation rate.
This paper then showed that more liberal policy, as measured by the new
policy index, is associated with higher income per capita growth. The size of
the association is notable. In the preferred model, a one-standard-deviation
increase in the liberal policy index raises growth by 0.72 percentage points.
Since the model uncertainty problem is likely to prevail in our context,
the paper adopts a Bayesian model averaging approach to address this prob-
lem. The key ￿ndings are that government policies are more liberal in coun-
tries which possess a right-wing or centrist executive party, enjoy greater
political stability, and are former Spanish colonies. In contrast, countries
which are less ethnically diverse, are former French colonies, and have a
military leader as head of state tend to implement less liberal policies. A
one-standard-deviation change in these variables results in a 0.17-0.41 stan-
dard deviation change in the liberal policy indicator, so their eﬀects are
substantial.
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39  Table 1: Economic freedom in high and low-income countries 
 
Liberal policy  Variable  High-income Low-income countries 
    countries Overall Most liberal Least liberal 
  Starting a business  Time (days)  23 54 27 77 
     Cost (% of income per capita)  7.4 95.3 15.3 152.6 
  Dealing with licenses  Time (days)  155 223 135 283 
     Cost (% of income per capita)  85.4 791 98.8 848 
Deregulation   Hiring & firing workers  Rigidity of employment index  34.4 43.0 23.6 50.4 
  Registering property  Time (days)  48 95 24 245 
     Cost (% of property value)  4.5 7.2 4.8 15 
  Closing a business  Time (years)  1.8 3.5 2.5 4.3 
      Cost (% of estate)  8.4 18.6 12.4 18.0 
  Getting credit  Legal rights index  6.4 4.5 5.8 3.0 
Protection of      Credit information index  4.8 2.2 4.8 1.8 
property rights   Protecting investors  Investor protection index  6.1 4.8 6.1 3.9 
 Enforcing  contracts  Time  (days)  273 425 292 491 
      Cost (% of debt)  11.7 35.4 12.8 31.5 
Trade liberalization   Import duties/tax revenue  4.1 16.9 4.9 25.3 
    Time for export (days)  13 37 17 53 
      Time for import (days)  15 46 19 66 
 
Notes: All variables, except import duties, are taken from World Bank (2005). The import duties data, measured in 2004 or the most recent year 
available, are from World Bank (2004). The figures for the most (least) liberal countries are derived from top five countries with the most (least) 
liberal policies, according to a new policy index proposed in this paper. See text for more details. Higher rigidity of employment index means 
more rigid regulation. Higher legal rights index indicates that laws are better designed to expand access to credit. Higher credit information index 







 Figure 1: Liberal policy and GDP growth 
 
 
             
Notes: This figure shows a partial scatter plot of GDP per capita growth, against the liberal policy index (RLIBERAL) during 1970-1999.  
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 Table 2: Principal components analysis for the Washington Consensus policy indicators  
 
Aspect of  Washington  Variable  Expected (1)  Classical  (1)  Robust  (2)  Classical  (2)  Robust 
policy  Consensus     sign  1st PC  2nd PC  1st PC  2nd PC 1st PC 2nd PC  1st PC  2nd PC 
  Fiscal discipline   SURPLUS  +  0.608 0.108  0.556 0.212 0.351 0.322 0.313 0.089 
   DEBT  -  -0.428 0.323  -0.489 0.180          
 Public  spending  EDU  +  -0.323 0.475  -0.409 0.430 0.006 0.164 0.020 0.562 
 prioritization  HEALTH  +  -0.049 -0.465  0.054 -0.345 0.231 -0.474 0.257 -0.118 
Macroeconomic Tax reform  MARTAXFI  +  0.511 -0.389  0.577 -0.170          
 Interest  rate  lib￿n  REALI  +  0.023 -0.389  0.103 -0.276 0.102 -0.171 0.101 -0.073 
 Competitive  BMP  -  -0.314 -0.788  -0.145 -0.827 -0.287 -0.753 -0.251 -0.632 
 exchange  rate  OVERVALU -  -0.383 -0.353 -0.310 -0.420 -0.428 -0.325 -0.404 -0.105 
     ERATE  -  -0.012 -0.715  0.128 -0.691 -0.057 -0.736 -0.026 -0.763 
   INFLA  -  0.047 -0.733  0.209 -0.643 0.066 -0.684 0.103 -0.584 
   MDUTY  -  -0.496 0.311  -0.536 0.103 -0.533 0.376 -0.545 0.311 
  Trade policy   SW  +  0.732 0.334  0.650 0.579 0.778 0.198 0.769 0.258 
 reform  TRADEFI  +  0.338 0.178 0.276 0.297   
   TRADEHF  -  -0.850 0.095  -0.846 -0.168 -0.777 0.111 -0.783 0.127 
 FDI  promotion  FDIHF  -  -0.690 0.343  -0.737 0.119 -0.748 0.258 -0.757 0.164 
   GOVTEM  -  0.411 0.016  0.424 0.208   
Development Privatization  SOEFI  +  0.726 -0.078  0.719 0.120 0.604 -0.058 0.589 -0.231 
   SOEHF  -  -0.695 0.249  -0.748 0.018 -0.556 0.264 -0.562 0.377 
   REGKKM  +  0.854 -0.145  0.864 0.154 0.906 -0.150 0.917 -0.040 
 Deregulation  REGFI  +  0.410 0.503  0.312 0.665 0.579 0.202 0.578 0.260 
   REGHF  -  -0.737 0.116  -0.749 -0.170 -0.809 0.190 -0.823 0.012 
 Property  rights  PROPFI  +  0.481 0.470 0.374 0.628 0.520 0.458 0.504 0.566 
 protection  PROPHF  -  -0.723 -0.309  -0.648 -0.532 -0.799 -0.128 -0.799 -0.244 
    Number of countries  34  34  62  62 
   %  Variance  explained  28.87 16.05  28.47 18.18 31.08 14.34 35.50 14.78 
 
Notes: Numbers shown are the correlations between principal components (PCs) and corresponding variables. Numbers in bold indicate 
the higher correlations between that PC and corresponding variables.    
 Table 3: Principal components analysis for the development elements of the Washington Consensus 
 
Variable  Expected  (1)  Classical  (1)  Robust  (2)  Classical  (2)  Robust 
   sign  1st PC 2nd PC 1st PC 2nd PC  1st PC 2nd PC 1st PC 2nd PC
MDUTY -  -0.518 -0.617 -0.489 -0.523  -0.454 -0.589 -0.452 -0.226
SW +  0.778 0.035 0.778 0.290  0.756 0.011 0.761 -0.153
TRADEFI +  0.459 0.720 0.424 0.816       
TRADEHF -  -0.845 -0.135 -0.837 -0.245  -0.792 -0.260 -0.792 -0.120
FDIHF -  -0.714 0.242 -0.729 0.172  -0.778 0.061 -0.771 -0.200
GOVTEM  - 0.417 -0.363 0.401 0.029       
SOEFI +  0.661 -0.135 0.658 -0.048  0.587 0.428 0.591 0.297
SOEHF -  -0.628 0.322 -0.656 0.293  -0.560 -0.375 -0.568 -0.498
REGKKM +  0.911 -0.072 0.917 0.108  0.923 -0.047 0.921 0.032
REGFI +  0.545 -0.178 0.530 0.224  0.600 -0.197 0.600 -0.180
REGHF - -0.812 0.116 -0.819 -0.098  -0.834 0.227 -0.828 0.005
PROPFI +  0.472 0.310 0.453 0.521  0.478 -0.499 0.484 -0.745
PROPHF -  -0.803 0.081 -0.818 -0.161  -0.819 0.374 -0.817 0.214
Number of countries  50  50  68  68 
% Variance explained  45.91 10.64 45.16 12.20  49.77 11.12 54.63 9.93
 
Notes: Numbers shown are the correlations between principal components (PCs) and corresponding variables. Numbers 
in bold indicate the higher correlations between that PC and corresponding variables. Column (2) Robust shows the 










 Table 4: The liberal policy index (RLIBERAL) and GDP growth regressions 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
RLIBERAL 0.772  0.667  0.716  0.766 
 (0.25)**  (0.30)*  (0.34)*  (0.38)* 
GDP per capita in 1970    -1.111  -1.104  -0.896 
   (0.35)**  (0.47)*  (0.39)* 
Investment   0.985  0.670   
   (0.26)**  (0.32)*   
Population growth    -0.232  -0.177  -0.085 
   (0.21)  (0.27)  (0.27) 
Literacy in 1970    0.407  0.444  0.589 
   (0.25)  (0.29)  (0.31) 
        
Regional dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes 
R2 0.15  0.49  0.53  0.46 
Number of countries  68  66  66  66 
        
hettest 0.65  0.05  0.15  0.70 
whitetst 0.76  0.30  0.77  0.96 
ovtest 0.07  0.82  0.25  0.77 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual GDP per capita growth over 1970-99, in percentage 
points. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5%, respectively.  Numbers shown in parentheses 
are MacKinnon and White (1985) heteroskedasticity-consistent (hc3) standard errors. The explanatory 
variables are standardized to have a standard deviation of one, and so the coefficients represent the 
effect of a one-standard-deviation change on the annual growth rate. All regressions have a constant. 
Regional dummies are for East Asia and the Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, and Middle East and North Africa. hettest performs the Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroskedasticity in the independent variables. whitetst performs a variant of the White test for 
heteroskedasticity that uses the predicted values from the original regression and their squared 
values. ovtest performs the Ramsey’s regression specification error test for omitted variables. The 




















 Table 5: Posterior inclusion probability (PIP) of independent variables explaining  
the liberal policy index (RLIBERAL) 
 
    Independent  variable  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (4.1)   
1  Military  head  1.000 (-) 1.000 (-) 1.000 (-) 1.000 (-)  1.000 
2  French  colony  1.000 (-) 1.000 (-) 0.882 (-) 0.327 (-)  0.704 
3  Nationalist executive party  0.998  (-)  1.000 (-)  0.465 (-)  0.043    0.028 
4 Political  stability  0.990 (+)     1.000 (+) 0.993 (+)  0.999 
5 Centre-wing  government  0.986 (+) 0.933 (+) 1.000 (+) 1.000 (+)  0.866 
6  Lack of corruption  0.985  (+) 1.000 (+) 0.987 (+)  0.894  (+)  0.053 
7 Right-wing  government  0.732 (+) 0.818 (+) 0.980 (+) 1.000 (+)  0.965 
8 Media  development  0.621 (+) 0.986 (+) 0.050   0.003     
9  GDP per capita in 1970  0.526  (+) 0.053   0.881 (+)  0.138    0.361 
10 Trade  openness  0.360 (+) 0.689 (+) 0.042   0.000     
11 Voter  turnout  0.300 (+) 0.085   0.115   0.036    0.015 
12  Ethnic  fragmentation  0.150  0.106  0.947 (+)  0.984  (+)  0.656 
13  Population in 1970  0.129    0.075   0.000        
14 Spanish  colony  0.107    0.341 (+) 0.382 (+) 0.930 (+)  0.304 
15  Political  particularism  0.075  0.051  0.000        
16  British  colony  0.055  0.102  0.101  0.082   0.021 
17  Presidential  system  0.055  0.025  0.067  0.001   0.026 
18  Lack of political rights  0.038    0.000   0.000        
19  Re-electability  incentive  0.019  0.037  0.233 (-)  0.000    
20  Changes in constitutions   0.019    0.182   0.280 (-)  0.875  (-)  0.016 
21  Political system maturity  0.013    0.196   0.000   0.091    0.009 
22  Political  constraints  0.010  0.000  0.392 (-)  0.045   0.016 
23  Degree  of  democracy  0.004  0.000  0.066  0.088   0.022 
24  Parliamentary  system  0.001  0.000  0.016  0.119   0.011 
25  Int’l  political  engagement  0.001  0.001  0.058  0.137   0.021 
26  Unconst gov’t instability  0.000        0.076   0.358  (-)  0.122 
27  Adverse regime change  0.000        0.003        
28  Ideology  difference  0.000  0.001  0.095  0.062   0.016 
29 Plurality  0.000    0.005   0.000  0.000    
30  Women in parliament  0.000    0.001   0.031   0.000     
31  Electoral  competitiveness  0.000  0.034  0.070  0.000    
32 Left-wing  government  0.000    0.000   0.191  0.000    
33 Other  colonies  0.000    0.000   0.081  0.001    
34 Proportionality  0.000    0.008   0.000  0.000    
35  Const  gov’t  instability  0.000  0.060  0.017        
36  Changes in executives  0.000    0.000   0.003        
37  Income  inequality  0.000  0.030  0.000        
38 Government  tiers  0.000    0.000   0.000      
39  Changes in executive parties  0.000    0.000   0.000      
40  Election fraud   0.000    0.000   0.000      
                 
41 South  Asia           0.094  0.113   0.576 
42  East Asia & Pacific          0.955 (+)  0.885  (+)  0.389 
43  Latin America & Caribbean          0.063   0.108    0.367 
44  Middle East & North Africa           0.029   0.125    0.053 
45  Sub-Sahara  Africa       0.152   0.493  (-)  0.658 Table 5 (continued) 
 
   Independent variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (4.1) 
46  State antiquity               0.041    0.106 
47  European  languages             0.005    
48  Land  area             0.132    
49  Elevation             0.000    
50 Tropical  land  area              0.623  (+)  0.148 
51  Distance to major markets              0.307  (-)  0.032 
52  Landlocked             0.028  0.013 
53  Latitude             0.000    
54  Point-source  resources             0.000    
55  People in tropics              0.007     
                  
Number of variables  40 37 45 45    30
Number of countries  68 68 68 61    63
 
Notes: Numbers shown are the posterior inclusion probabilities (PIPs), i.e. the probabilities that 
coefficients of independent variables are not zero. Variables whose PIPs are 0.20 or greater are 
considered important. (+) and (-) show the signs between the variables and RLIBERAL. The results in 




























 Table 6: Top ten models and their posterior model probabilities for RLIBERAL from the bicreg approach 
 
Independent Variable  PIP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Right-wing government  1.000 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Centre-wing government  1.000 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Military head  1.000 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Political stability  0.993 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Ethnic fragmentation  0.984 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Spanish colony  0.930 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Lack of corruption  0.894 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
East Asia & Pacific  0.885 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Changes in constitutions  0.875 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Tropical land area  0.623 ● ● ● ● ●  
Sub-Sahara Africa  0.493 ● ● ● ●  
Unconstitutional gov￿t instability  0.358 ● ● ●  
French colony  0.327 ● ● ● ● 
Distance to major markets  0.307 ● ● ● ● 
GDP per capita in 1970  0.138 ● 
International political engagement  0.137 ●  
Land area  0.132 ●  
    
N u m b e r  o f  v a r i a b l e s1 11 11 21 21 01 21 11 01 21 2  
Posterior model probability 0.0484 0.0459 0.0332 0.0305 0.0210 0.0210 0.0209 0.0187 0.0186 0.0184 
 
        Notes: The posterior inclusion probabilities (PIPs) shown are taken from column (4) in Table 5.Table 7: Top ten models and their posterior model probabilities for RLIBERAL from the MC3 approach 
 
Independent Variable  PIP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Military head  1.000 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Political stability  0.999 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Right-wing government  0.965 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Centre-wing government  0.866 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Sub-Sahara Africa  0.658 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
French colony  0.704 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Ethnic fragmentation  0.656 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
South Asia  0.576 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
East Asia & Pacific  0.389 ● ● ●  
GDP per capita in 1970  0.361 ● ● ●  
Latin America & Caribbean  0.367 ● ● ● ●  
Spanish colony  0.304 ● ●  
Tropical land area  0.148 ●  
Unconstitutional gov￿t instability  0.122 ●  
   
N u m b e r  o f  v a r i a b l e s9 1 1 1 07799868  
Posterior model probability 0.0229 0.0222 0.0195 0.0169 0.0138 0.0131 0.0113 0.0110 0.0109 0.0096 
 











 Table 8: Determinants of the liberal policy index (RLIBERAL) 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Political  stability  0.622  0.766 0.935 1.466 1.300 
  (0.23)**  (0.28)** (0.19)** (0.30)** (0.25)** 
Right-wing  government  2.360  2.405 2.464 2.016 1.685 
  (0.49)**  (0.45)** (0.45)** (0.68)** (0.60)** 
Centre-wing  government  3.117  3.149 3.224 3.862 3.329 
  (1.14)** (1.44)* (0.62)**  (1.60)* (1.42)* 
Military  head  -12.741  -13.895 -14.893 -19.191 -17.650 
  (2.97)**  (2.51)** (2.19)** (2.38)** (2.91)** 
Ethnic  fragmentation  2.382  2.439 2.201 1.936 1.760 
  (0.54)**  (0.58)** (0.51)** (0.65)** (0.66)** 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  -0.945  -2.619 -3.372 -2.179 -2.543 
 (0.38)*  (2.85)  (0.90)**  (0.58)**  (0.79)** 
Spanish colony  1.212  1.467  1.395     
 (0.39)**  (0.40)**  (0.38)**     
Lack of corruption  1.303  0.990  0.588     
 (0.38)**  (0.48)*  (-0.32)     
Changes in constitutions  -3.675  -2.593  -0.421     
 (1.72)*  (2.05)  (1.44)     
Tropical land area  0.312  0.411  0.401     
 (0.20)  (0.11)**  (0.13)**     
East Asia & Pacific  1.745  0.174  -0.217     
 (0.41)**  (2.83)  (0.87)     
French colony        -1.173  -0.969 
       (0.33)**  (0.34)** 
South Asia        -1.962  -1.999 
       (0.85)*  (1.02) 
Latin America & Caribbean        -0.832  -1.854 
       -0.48  (0.60)** 
        
Approach bicreg  bicreg  bicreg  MC3 MC3 
Control variables  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
R2  0.85  0.86 0.92 0.77 0.83 
Number of countries  66  66  62  68  68 
        
hettest  0.86  0.54 0.35 0.00 0.08 
whitetst  0.05  0.07 0.10 0.61 0.94 
ovtest  0.74  0.95 0.93 0.17 0.33 
        
Beta value  Col (2)  Col (5)       
Political stability  0.24  0.41       
Right-wing government  0.34  0.22       
Centre-wing government  0.22  0.22       
Military head  -0.31  -0.36       
Ethnic fragmentation  0.28  0.19       
Tropical land area  0.16         
Spanish  colony  0.29      
French colony    -0.17       
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the liberal policy index (RLIBERAL). ** and * denote significance at 
the 1% and 5%, respectively.  Numbers shown in parentheses are MacKinnon and White (1985) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent (hc3) standard errors. Control variables include GDP per capita level and 
population in 1970, and five regional dummies. For other notes, see notes in Table 4. Appendix Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
 Variable  Obs. Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max
 MDUTY  68 10.464 4.976 0.825  31.311
 SW  68 0.333 0.326 0.000  1.000
 TRADEFI  64 4.615 1.985 0.000  9.930
 TRADEHF  68 3.961 0.978 1.000  5.000
 FDIHF  68 2.761 0.856 1.000  5.000
Washington GOVTEM  54 1.133 1.111 0.000  5.000
Consensus SOEFI  68 3.137 2.321 0.000  8.000
 SOEHF  68 3.043 0.809 1.667  4.800
 REGKKM  68 0.047 0.631 -1.515  1.799
 REGFI  68 5.165 0.862 2.804  6.878
 REGHF  68 3.099 0.685 1.667  4.833
 PROPFI  68 4.325 1.092 2.381  7.543
 PROPHF  68 3.002 0.904 1.000  5.000
Composite RLIBERAL  68 0.000 1.000 -2.153  2.944
index CLIBERAL  68 0.000 1.000 -2.162  2.939
 RGDP7099C  68 0.014 0.020 -0.031  0.064
 SCHOOL70 58 0.846 0.769 -1.619  1.826
 LITERACY  66 3.731 0.667 1.749  4.536
 INVEST  68 2.513 0.556 0.797  3.814
 PRIINVEST 65 2.492 0.488 0.855  3.261
Growth PUBINVEST  65 2.040 0.378 1.296 3.119
regressions RGDPPC70  68 6.460 0.673 5.189  7.927
 POPG 68 -2.577 0.093 -2.894  -2.419
 RGNEAP  68 0.118 0.325 0.000  1.000
 RGNECA  68 0.015 0.121 0.000  1.000
 RGNMENA  68 0.103 0.306 0.000  1.000
 RGNSA  68 0.074 0.263 0.000  1.000
 RGNSSA  68 0.353 0.481 0.000  1.000
 RGNLAC  68 0.324 0.471 0.000  1.000
 
Note: These descriptive statistics are computed from 68 countries that the liberal policy 




















                             Appendix Table 2: Simple correlations among the proxies of Washington Consensus development element variables 
 
 MDUTY SW  TRADEFI TRADEHF FDIHF  GOVTEM SOEFI  SOEHF REGKKM REGFI  REGHF PROPFI PROPHF 
MDUTY  1.000                 
SW  -0.347 1.000                 
TRADEFI  -0.532 0.382  1.000              
TRADEHF  0.555 -0.590  -0.427 1.000            
FDIHF 0.320 -0.433  -0.128 0.606 1.000           
GOVTEM  -0.062 0.333  0.061 -0.290 -0.315 1.000         
SOEFI -0.326 0.457  0.167 -0.583 -0.417 0.208 1.000         
SOEHF 0.182 -0.536  -0.026 0.543 0.412 -0.201 -0.465  1.000          
REGKKM -0.453 0.610  0.328 -0.751 -0.711 0.298 0.582  -0.554 1.000        
REGFI -0.089 0.424  0.192 -0.360 -0.233 0.313 0.416  -0.184 0.516 1.000      
REGHF 0.367 -0.494  -0.359 0.552 0.702 -0.442 -0.392  0.445 -0.779 -0.376 1.000    
PROPFI -0.238 0.439  0.284 -0.379 -0.125 0.130 0.178  -0.176 0.360 0.253 -0.275 1.000  

















 Appendix Table 3: List of countries and the robust (RLIBERAL) and classical (CLIBERAL) liberal policy indices  
 
Code  Country name  RLIBERAL  CLIBERAL    Code  Country name  RLIBERAL  CLIBERAL 
DZA Algeria  -1.265 -1.250   MWI  Malawi  -0.652 -0.626
ARG Argentina  0.980 0.985   MYS  Malaysia  1.195 1.181
BGD Bangladesh  -1.047 -1.046   MLI  Mali  0.177 0.208
BEN Benin  -0.428 -0.423   MUS  Mauritius  1.056 1.027
BOL Bolivia  0.956 0.981   MEX  Mexico  0.616 0.602
BWA Botswana  0.595 0.600   MAR  Morocco  0.030 0.040
BRA Brazil  0.205 0.191   NPL  Nepal  -0.613 -0.630
BDI Burundi  -1.451 -1.464  NIC  Nicaragua  -0.464 -0.457
CMR Cameroon  -0.549 -0.574   NER  Niger  -0.924 -0.934
TCD Chad  -1.364 -1.377   NGA  Nigeria  -0.657 -0.640
CHL Chile  1.690 1.674   PAK  Pakistan  -0.751 -0.726
CHN China  -0.797 -0.801   PAN  Panama  0.950 0.978
COL  Colombia  0.529 0.545   PNG  Papua New Guinea  -0.194 -0.204
COG Congo,  Republic  -1.479 -1.458   PRY  Paraguay  0.758 0.778
CRI Costa  Rica  1.000 0.996  PER  Peru  0.563 0.566
CYP Cyprus  1.385 1.374   PHL  Philippines  0.680 0.658
DOM Dominican  Republic  0.203 0.163   RWA  Rwanda  -1.626 -1.630
ECU Ecuador  0.556 0.538   SEN  Senegal  -0.712 -0.701
EGY Egypt  -0.502 -0.505   SLE  Sierra  Leone  -0.740 -0.761
SLV El  Salvador  1.121 1.131   SGP  Singapore  2.944 2.939
GAB Gabon  -0.345 -0.318   KOR  South  Korea  1.497 1.481
GHA Ghana  -0.279 -0.269   LKA  Sri  Lanka  0.625 0.628
GTM Guatemala  0.638 0.620   SYR  Syria  -1.718 -1.714
GNB Guinea-Bissau  -1.267 -1.303   TZA  Tanzania  -0.551 -0.544
GUY Guyana  -0.347 -0.319   THA  Thailand  1.248 1.220
HTI Haiti  -1.488 -1.491   TGO  Togo  -1.182 -1.190
HND  Honduras  0.062 0.062   TTO  Trinidad and Tobago  1.111 1.136
IND India  -1.069 -1.088   TUN  Tunisia  -0.105 -0.083
IDN Indonesia  0.611 0.596   TUR  Turkey  1.012 1.008
IRN Iran  -2.153 -2.162   UGA Uganda  0.040 0.078
JAM Jamaica  0.965 0.986   URY  Uruguay  1.346 1.335
JOR Jordan  0.578 0.609   VEN  Venezuela  0.137 0.133
KEN Kenya  -0.068 -0.069   ZMB  Zambia  0.326 0.334
MDG Madagascar  -0.608 -0.634   ZWE  Zimbabwe  -0.989 -0.991 
Appendix Table 4: Variables and definitions for the Washington Consensus development element variables 
 
Variable   Variable description   Source 
Sachs and Warner index 
(SW) 
Dummy variable. 0 indicates closed economy and 1 indicates open economy. Closed 
economy has high tariff rates, high non-tariff barriers, high black market premiums, 
adopts socialist system, and has state as an export monopolist. 
Sachs and Warner (1995) 
and Waczairg and Welch 
(2003)  
Import duty (MDUTY)  Mean import duty over total import value  
World Bank (2004) and 
Yanikkaya (2003) 
Mean tariff rate score 
(TRADEFI)  0-10 scale with higher score value means lower average tariff rate 
Gwartney and Lawson 
(2004)  
Trade policy score 
(TRADEHF)  1-5 scale with higher score value means higher weighted average tariff rate  Miles et.al. (2004)  
Openness to FDI 
(FDIHF) 
Investment score. 1-5 scale with higher score value means an economy is less open to 
foreign direct investment   Miles et.al. (2004) 
Government 
employment (GOVTEM) 
Civilian central government employment over total employment, excluding those in 
education, health, and police affairs.     World Bank (2001) 
Government enterprises 
and investment score 
(SOEFI) 
0-10 scale with higher score value means lower extent of state-owned enterprises and 
government investment in the economy.  





An average of two sub-scores: government consumption and state-owned enterprises 
scores. Higher score value means higher extent of state-owned enterprises in an economy.  Miles et.al. (2004) 
Regulation of credit, 
labour, and business 
score (REGFI) 
0-10 scale with higher score value means less regulated credit markets and labour 
markets, and fewer business regulations.  
Gwartney and Lawson 
(2004) 
Banking & finance, 
wages & prices, and 
regulation scores 
(REGHF)  
Average of three scores: banking and finance, wages and prices, and regulation scores. 
Higher score value means more regulated economy.    Miles et.al. (2004) Regulatory quality 
(REGKKM) 
Measures market-unfriendly policies, e.g. price control, bank supervision and excessive 
regulation. Higher index value indicates fewer regulations.  Kaufmann et al. (2003)  
Legal structure and 
property rights score 
(PROPFI)  0-10 scale with higher score value means better protection of private property rights.  
Gwartney and Lawson 
(2004) 
Property rights score 
(PROPHF)  1-5 scale with higher score value means worse protection of private property rights.   Miles et.al. (2004) 
 
 
Appendix Table 5: Variables and definitions for the growth regressions variables 
 
Variable name  Variable description  Source  
Investment (INVEST)  Natural log of real investment over real GDP  Heston et al. (2002) 
Population growth 
(POPG) 
Natural log of average annual growth rate of population aged 15-64, 1970-99. This rate is added 
with depreciation rate of 0.05.   World Bank (2004) 
Schooling 
(SCHOOL70) 
Natural log of average years of schooling at all educational levels of population aged over 15 in 
1970 
Barro and Lee 
(2000) 
Literacy rate 
(LITERACY)  Natural log of (100 - illiteracy rate of population aged over 15 in 1970)  World Bank (2004) 
Initial GDP 
(RGDPPC70)  Natural log of real GDP per capita in 1970  Heston et al. (2002) 
GDP growth 
(RGDP7099) 
Natural log of real GDP per capita in 1999 minus that of 1970. This is divided by 29, to obtain 
annual growth rates.  Heston et al. (2002) 
Regional dummy  Five regions: East Asia and the Pacific, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Sahara 
Africa, and Latin America and Caribbean 
Easterly and 
Sewadeh (2002) 
Liberal policy  index 
(RLIBERAL) 
A score from a robust principal components analysis derived from 11 proxies for the Washington 
Consensus development elements. Higher index value indicates more liberal government policy. 
See text for more details.  
Own construction. 
See data sources in 
Appendix Table 4. 
                       Appendix Table 6: Variables and definitions for the independent variables 
 
Variable  Variable description  Source  
Political variable     
Degree of democracy 
(POLITY) 
Degree of democracy=democratic score-autocratic score. Higher value indicates more democratic 
society. This is the main proxy for degree of democracy variable.   
Marshall and 
Jaggers (2000) 
Degree of democracy 
(GOLDERDE) 
Two classifications: democracy and dictatorship. Higher score value indicates less democratic 
society.  Golder (2004) 
Degree of democracy 
(REICEDE) 
Three classifications: authoritarian, semi-democratic and democratic. These are assigned the 
values of 0, 1 and 2 respectively. Hence, a higher score value indicates more democratic society.   Reich (2002) 
Parliamentary system 
(PARLIA)  Share of years between 1975-99 that a parliamentary system was adopted  Beck et al. (2001) 
Presidential system 
(DIRCPRES) 
Share of years between 1975-99 that a direct presidential system was adopted. An omitted 
category for political regime variables (PARLIA and DIRCPRES) is elected presidential.    Beck et al. (2001) 
Right-wing party 
(RGHTWING)  Dummy variable indicates Conservative or Christian democratic parties adopting  liberal policies  Beck et al. (2001) 
Left-wing party 
(LEFTWING)  Dummy variable indicates Communist or socialist parties adopting state-based policies  Beck et al. (2001) 
Centre-wing party 
(CNTRWING)  Dummy variable indicates parties adopting both market- and state-based policies  Beck et al. (2001) 
Political constraints 
(POLCON) 
Extent of political constraints in policy-making process. Higher value means stronger constraints. 
This is the main proxy for political constraints variable.    Henisz (2000) 
Executive constraints 








Probability that two deputies selected at random from among government parties will be from 
different parties  Beck et al. (2001) 
Margin of majority 
(MAJORITY)  Share of government seats in total seats  Beck et al. (2001) 
All houses control 
(ALLHOUSE) 
Dummy variable indicates whether executive party has an absolute majority in all houses that 
have law-making powers  Beck et al. (2001) Checks (CHECKS) 
Extent of checks and balances in policy-making process. Higher value means stronger checks and 
balances (e.g. by having competitively elected executives)  Beck et al. (2001) 
Stability (STABS) 
Percent of veto players who drop from the government. Higher value means less stable roles of 
veto players.  Beck et al. (2001) 
Political system maturity 
(PARTYAGE)  Average age (in years) of the largest two government parties and the largest opposition party  Beck et al. (2001) 
Nationalist party 
(NATIOPAR)  Dummy variables indicates executive party being a nationalist party   Beck et al. (2001) 
Regional-oriented party 
(REGIOPAR)  Dummy variables indicates executive party being a regional-oriented party   Beck et al. (2001) 
Electoral  
competitiveness (LIEC) 
Legislative index of electoral competitiveness.  Higher score value means more intense 
competition in the election for legislative body.   Beck et al. (2001) 
Proportionality 
(PROPOR)  Share of years between 1975-99 that a proportional electoral rule was adopted  Beck et al. (2001) 
Plurality (PLURAL)  Share of years between 1975-99 that a plural electoral rule was adopted.    Beck et al. (2001) 
Ideology difference 
(WINGDIFF) 
Difference in political ideology between executive party and those of the three largest government 
parties and the largest opposition party.   Beck et al. (2001) 
Election fraud 
(FRUADELE)  A dummy indicates whether election fraud tends to affect electoral outcomes significantly  Beck et al. (2001) 
Re-electability incentive 
(FIMUTERM) 
Dummy variable equals to one if there is a finite office term for executive and serving multiple 
terms is possible  Beck et al. (2001) 
Military head 
(MILIHEAD)  Dummy variable indicates having military as a head of state  




Extent of political stability including a chance that a current government will be overthrown and 
political violence. Higher score means higher political stability. 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2003)  
Violent political unrest 
(VIUNREST) 
A score from a principal components analysis derived from assassinations, guerrilla warfare, 
major government crises, purges, riots, revolutions and coups. Higher value means more frequent 
political unrest. See text for more details.     
Own construction 
with data from De 




A score from a principal components analysis derived from general strikes and anti-government 
demonstration. Higher value means more frequent political unrest. See text for more details.     
Own construction 
with data from De 
Mesquita et al. 
(2003) Socio-political instability 
Three different indicators. VULESPI1 and VULESPI2 are scores from a principal components 
analysis. VULESP1 includes general strikes, riots and government demonstrations. VULESPI2 
covers assassinations, guerrilla warfare and purges. VULESPI includes all six variables, derived 
from a logit method.  




Probability of irregular, violent changes in government such as those from coups. It is derived 
from a logit model, and depends on variables such as past macroeconomic performance and 
political disorder.    





Probability of regular, major changes in government such as the public desire in replacing a 
current government. Same methodology as PROBIRCH.  
Feng, Kugler and 
Zak (2000) 
Changes in executives 
(EXECHG)  Number of changes in executives during 1975-99  Beck et al. (2001) 
Changes in executive 
parties (PARTYCHG)  Number of changes in party of executives during 1975-99   Beck et al. (2001) 
Changes in constitution 
(CONSTCH)   Number of changes in constitutions during 1970-99 




Measure of the magnitude of events such as shifts from democratic to authoritarian system and 
collapses of central state authority.    




Extent of fair and free elections. Higher score value means less freedom for political participation 
and expression.  
Coppedge and  
Reinicke (1990) 
Suffrage (SUFFRAGE)  Right of voting index. Higher index value indicates fewer restrictions on characteristics of citizens 
who can vote.  
Paxton et al. (2003) 
Government tiers 
(GOVTIER)  Number of government tiers, e.g. central and local governments  Treisman (2002) 
Voter turnout 
(TURNOUT)  Share of actual number of voters in total registered number of voters  Pintor et al. (2002) 
Political particularism 
(PARTICU) 
The degree to which individual politicians are concerned about their own narrow geographic 




Degree which a country engages in international politics, measured by number of embassies in a 
country, membership in international organizations, and participation in the United Nations. 
Higher value means more involvement.   
Dreher (2003) 
Women in parliament 
(WOMENPAR)  Share of women seats in total seats in parliament 
UN common 
database Social variable     
Media development 
(MEDIADEV) 
A score from a principal components analysis derived from daily newspaper circulation per 
capita, radio per capita, and television per 1,000 people. See text for more details.  
Own construction 
with data from 
World Bank (2004) 
and De Mesquita et 
al. (2003)  
Press freedom 
(FREEPRES)  Extent of freedom of press and media. Lower value means higher freedom.   Karlekar (2004) 
Lack of political rights 
(POLRIGHT) 
Extent of free, fair elections and political participation. Higher score value indicates freer political 
rights.  
Piano and  
Puddington (2004) 
Income inequality (GINI)  GINI coefficient of income  
Dollar and Kraay 
(2002) 
Ethnic fragmentation 
(ETHNFRAC)  Extent of social diversity in term of different ethnic groups. Higher value means higher diversity.  Alesina et al. (2003) 
Linguistic fragmentation 
(LINGFRAC) 
Extent of social diversity in term of different languages spoken. Higher value means higher 
diversity.  Alesina et al. (2003) 
Religious fragmentation 
(RELIFRAC)  Extent of social diversity in term of different religions. Higher value means higher diversity.  Alesina et al. (2003) 
Population with different 
religions 
Share of population with different religions. Four classifications: Protestant (PROTEPOP), 
Catholic (CATHOPOP), Muslim (ISLAMPOP) and other religions (NARELPOP).  
La Porta et al. 
(1999) 
Lack of corruption 
(CORRUPT)  Control of corruption index. Higher index value means lower corruption.  
Kaufmann et al. 
(2003) 
Economic variable     
Trade openness (OPEN)  Share of exports and imports in GDP  Heston et al. (2002) 
Population size (POP70)  Population size in 1970  World Bank (2004) 
GDP per capita 1970 
(GDPPC70)  Real GDP per capita in 1970  Heston et al. (2002) 
Fixed, historical variable     
Latitude (LATILLSV)  Absolute value of the latitude 
La Porta et al. 
(1999) 
Landlocked 
(LANDLOCK)  Dummy variable indicates whether a country has direct access to seas and oceans 
Easterly and 
Sewadeh (2002) Distance to major market 
(LMINDIST)  Natural Log of minimum distance to a major market (USA, Japan and Belgium)  Haveman￿s website 
Land area (AREAKM2)   Natural log of total land area in squared kilometres  Gallup et al. (1999) 
Elevation (ELEV)   Natural log of mean elevation  Gallup et al. (1999) 
Tropical land area 
(TROPICAR)   Share of land area in tropical climate  Gallup et al. (1999) 
People in tropics 
(KGPTEMP) 
 
Share of people living in the Koeppen-Geigger temperate zone  Gallup et al. (1999)  
Point-source resources 
(RESPOINT)   Dummy variable indicating exporters of point-source natural resources such as gold  Isham et al. (2005) 
European settler 
(EURO1900)   Share of European settlers in total population in 1900  




(EUROFRAC)   Share of population speaking a European language  
Hall and Jones 
(1999) 
Regional dummy 
Six regions: East Asia and the Pacific (RGNEAP), East Europe and Central Asia (RGNECA), 
Middle East and North Africa (RGNMENA), South Asia (RGNSA), sub-Saharan Africa 




Four classifications: British (COLOGBR), French (COLOFRA), Spanish (COLOESP) and other 
colonies (COLOETC). COLOETC includes former Portuguese, Dutch, Belgian, Italian and German 
colonies.  
Acemoglu et al. 
(2001)   
Settler mortality 
(MORTAL)  Natural log of settler mortality rate between 17th and 19th centuries.  
Acemoglu et al. 
(2001)   
State antiquity 
(STATEHIS) 
Extent of independence and maturity of states. Countries with high index score will have had 
government above the tribal level during 1-1950 C.E, such government is locally based (i.e. not 
colony), and over 50 percent of the modern territory was ruled by this government. 
Bockstette et al. 




imputed data cells Imputed variables
Number of 
imputed data cells 
GOVTIER 7  CHRISPAR  1 
WOMENPAR 2  CATHOPAR 1 
PARTICUL 1  ISLAMPAR  1 
EXECHG 1  HINDUPAR  1 
PARTYCHG 3  BUDDHPAR  1 
PROBIRCH 3  JEWISPAR  1 
PROBMGCH 3  NARELPAR  1 
PROTEPOP 1  PLURAL  2 
CATHOPOP 1  PROPOR  4 
ISLAMPOP 1  DIRCPRES  1 
NARELPOP 1  ELECPRES 1 
LINGFRAC 3  PARLIA  1 
POLITY 1  NATIOPAR  1 
VANDEMOC 1  RURALPAR 1 
REICEDEM 6  REGIOPAR  1 
CHECKS 1  PARTYAGE  3 
STABS 1  FIMUTERM  1 
HERFGOV 1  LIEC  1 
GOVFRAC 1  EIEC  1 
MAJORITY 1  XRCOMP 1 
ALLHOUSE 2  WINGDIFF  1 
XCONST 1  CIVLIBER  4 
FRAUDELE 2  POLRIGHT  4 
POLYARC 1  POLENGAG  1 
TURNOUT 3  GINI  1 





(1) Number of imputed observations  95 
(2) Number of independent variables  109 
(3) Number of RLIBERAL  68 
(4) Number of total observations; (2)*(3)  7,412 
(5) Share of imputed data; (1)/(4)  1.28% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 